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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature oftlte Case 
This is an appeal from the Opinion on Appeal of the District Court ("Appellate 
Opinion"), which affirmed the judgment of conviction of the Appellant, Tanya Vargas, on one 
misdemeanor count of eluding a police officer. The Appellate Opinion erred in affirming the trial 
court's denial of Ms. Vargas's motion in limine seeking suppression of the police officer's 
identification of her, both in and out of court. Accordingly, the Appellate Opinion is 
appropriately reversed. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On June 5, 2015 Ms. Vargas was charged with one count of eluding a police officer in 
violation of Idaho Code § 49-1404. Ms. Vargas pied not guilty and the matter proceeded to a jury 
trial on March 15, 2016. Ms. Vargas's pre-trial motion in limine seeking suppression of the 
police officer's identification of her, both in and out of court, was denied by the trial court. The 
jury found Ms. Vargas guilty after a one day trial. Ms. Vargas was sentenced to 166 days of jail 
and was credited for 166 days served. (R., 0082.) Ms. Vargas timely appealed her judgment of 
conviction to the District Court on April 15, 2016. (R., 0083-0086.) On December 23, 2016 the 
District Court issued the Appellate Opinion affirming the trial court's denial of Ms Vargas's 
motion in limine. (R., 0154-0163.) Ms. Vargas timely appealed the Appellate Opinion on 
February 15, 2017. (R., 0164-0168.) 
C. Factual and Procedural History 
Just before 11 :00 p.m. on May 8, 2015 Boise Police Department Officer Natalie Wing 
was patrolling in a marked car in the vicinity of Curtis and Franklin in Boise, Ada County, Idaho. 
(Trial Tr., p. 7, L. 12-24.) Officer Wing observed a vehicle driving in front of her that had a non-
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functioning taillight. (Trial Tr., p. 8, L. 9-18.) Officer Wing followed the vehicle for 
approximately two minutes at a speed of thirty miles per hour. (Trial Tr., p. 21, L. 19-25.) 
Officer Wing attempted to stop the vehicle near the intersection of Curtis and Cassia. 
(Trial Tr., p. 9, L. 3-6.) Officer Wing turned on her overhead lights, at which time the vehicle 
slowed but did not stop. (Trial Tr., p. 10, L. 14-p. 11, L. l 0.) Pursuant to Boise Police 
Department policy, Officer Wing did not pursue the vehicle. (Trial Tr., p. 17, L. 1-15.) Officer 
Wing obtained the vehicle's license plate number. (Trial Tr., p. 10, L. 7-13.) 
While attempting to initiate the traffic stop, Officer Wing observed the driver glancing in 
the driver's sideview mirror "four to five times." (Trial Tr., p. 12, L. 22-p. 13, L 13.) Officer 
Wing never observed the driver from the front or the side, only from behind. (Trial Tr., p. 25, L. 
14-18.) Officer Wing observed the driver for a total of four to eight seconds. (Trial Tr., p. 26, L. 
14-21.) Based on these glances, Officer Wing described the driver as a Hispanic female in her 
thirties. (Trial Tr., p. 14, L. 2-5.) Officer Wing was unable to establish any other identifying 
characteristics of the driver, including build, height, tattoos or physical impairments. (Trial Tr., 
p. 27, L. 17-p.28, L. 17.) 
Officer Wing investigated the registered owner of the vehicle and obtained Ms. Vargas's 
name. (Trial Tr., p. 17, L. 12-24.) Officer Wing then obtained a state identification card of Mr. 
Vargas bearing her picture. (Trial Tr., p. 19, L. 9-13.) Officer Wing looked at no other photos or 
lineup and determined, based on the identification card photograph alone, that Ms. Vargas was 
driving the vehicle that failed to stop. (Trial Tr., p. 20, L. 16-20; Trial Tr., p. 29, L. 21-24.) 
Prior to trial, Ms. Vargas moved to suppress both Officer Wing's out of court, and 
expected in-court, identification of her. (Limine Tr., p. 12, L. 22-p. 22, L. 25.) The trial court 
denied the motion in limine. (Id.) 
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At trial, Officer Wing identified Ms. Vargas as the driver of the vehicle. (Trial Tr., p. 17, 
L. 25-p. 18, L. 10.) Officer Wing also testified regarding her out of court identification of Ms. 
Vargas as the driver of the vehicle. (Trial Tr., p. 19, L. 2-p. 20, L. 4.) Ms. Vargas was found 
guilty. (Trial Tr., p. 43, L. 15-19.) 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Appellate Opinion err in affirming the trial court's denial of Ms. Vargas's motion 
in limine seeking suppression of Officer Wing's identification of her, both in and out of court? 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Appellate Review 
For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the 
magistrate division, the Supreme Court reviews the magistrate record to determine whether there 
is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the 
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413,415, 
224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow 
therefrom, and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, the Supreme Court affirms 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. Id. Thus, the appellate courts do not review 
the decision ofthe magistrate. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965,968,318 P.3d 955,958 (Ct. App. 
2014). Rather, the Supreme Court is procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decision of the 
district court. Id. 
B. The Appellate Opinion Erred as a Matter of Law in Affirming the Trial Court's 
Denial of Ms. Vargas's Motion in Limine Seeking Suppression of Officer 
Wing'l' Identification of her, Both in and out of Court. 
The Appellate Opinion erred in affirming the trial court's denial of Ms. Vargas's motion 
in limine seeking suppression of Officer Wing's (1) out of court; and (2) in-court identification 
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because a single photo lineup, even one organized by law enforcement is, inherently suspicious 
and impermissibly suggestive as a matter of law. Though not reached by the Appellate Opinion 
for reasons discussed herein, the trial court also erred in ruling that Officer Wing's out of court 
identification of Ms. Vargas, even if impermissibly suggestive, was nonetheless reliable and thus 
admissible. 
1. Out of Court Identification. 
Out of court identifications "must be suppressed when, under the totality of the 
circumstances, "the identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive' that they give 
'rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification."' State v. Best, 117 Idaho 652, 654, 791 
P.2d 33, 35 (Ct. App. 1990) (quoting State v. Kysar, 116 Idaho 992, 994-94, 783 P.2d 859, 861-
62 ( 1989); State v. Edwards, 109 Idaho 50 I, 708 P .2d 906 (Ct. App. 1985). See also Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct. 375 (1972). "In particular, single subject showups are inherently 
suspect and generally not condoned." State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 162, 657 P.2d 17, 26 
(1983). 
Though an identification may be inherently suspicious, such inherent suspicion does not 
render it per se inadmissible. Rather, a two-step analysis must be completed. "[W]e first look at 
whether the identification procedures are overly suggestive, and if we find that they are, we 
examine whether the reliability of the identification outweighs the corrupting effect of the 
suggestive identification." State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584,594,301 P.3d 242,252 (2013). 
To determine the admissibility of the out of court identification testimony, reliability is 
the foundation upon which the testimony is weighed. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S. 
Ct. 2243 (1977). Five factors must be considered to determine the reliability of the identification: 
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(1) the opportunity for the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the degree of 
the witness' attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal; (4) the 
level of certainty demonstrated at the identification; and (5) the time span between the crime and 
the identification. Kysar, supra; Manson, supra; State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 657 P.2d 17 
(1983). 
The trial court denied Ms. Vargas's motion in limine seeking suppression of Officer 
Wing's out of court identification. The trial court premised its ruling on two bases: (I) 
characterization of Officer Wing's out of court identification as the culmination of a permissible 
investigation, and not a single photo lineup (Limine Tr., p. 13, L. 5-8; p. 17, L. 24-p. 18, L. 3); 
and (2) reasoning that even if the identification was impermissibly suggestive, it was nonetheless 
sufficiently reliable as to be admissible (Limine Tr., p. 18, L. 4-p. 20, L. 23). Stated differently, 
the trial court ruled that Officer Wing's identification of Ms. Vargas was not impermissibly 
suggestive because it was made by law enforcement during an investigation, thereby obviating 
the necessity of analyzing the reliability factors set forth in Manson. Assuming arguendo that the 
identification was impermissibly suggestive, the trial court found the identification nonetheless 
reliable after consideration of the Manson factors, which are only reached in instances where an 
identification is impermissible in the first instance. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 594, 301 
P.3d 242, 252 (2013) ("As previously stated we first look at whether the identification 
procedures are overly suggestive, and if we find that they are, we examine whether the reliability 
of the identification outweighs the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification.") 
The Appellate Opinion affirmed the trial court, ruling that Officer' Wing's identification 
was not impermissibly suggestive: 
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The appellant has not shown that Officer Wings' [sic] identification of the appellant by 
viewing her driver's license photo, after her observations and obtaining the license plate 
number and registration information, was the result of improper ("tainted") state conduct. 
... One may have serious concerns about the reliability of the identification, but the 
process leading to the identification is not violative of due process. 
(R., 0160.) 
Because the Appellate Opinion determined that Officer Wing's identification of Ms. 
Vargas was not impermissibly suggestive, it did not reach the second step of the analysis and 
consider the Manson reliability factors. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 594, 301 P.3d 242, 252 
(2013) ("As previously stated we first look at whether the identification procedures are overly 
suggestive, and if we find that they are, we examine whether the reliability of the identification 
outweighs the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification.") 
In ruiing that Officer Wing's identification of Ms. Vargas was not impermissibly 
suggestive, the Appellate Opinion wholly relied upon a decision of the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals, State v. Hooks, 752 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). In Hooks, Urbanski, an 
undercover officer, was making a controlled purchase of narcotics with the assistance of an 
informant. Id. at 82. Urbanski and the informant drove to a bar where the informant spoke to a 
man in a parked car. Id. The man executed a U-tum and pulled alongside Urbanski's car "so that 
the drivers were within reach of each other." Id. Urbanksi purchased crack cocaine from the 
man. Id. Urbanski reported the license plate number and learned the car was registered to Keith 
Hooks. Id. Urbanski looked up Hooks' drivers license photo and identified the man from whom 
he purchased the crack cocaine as Hooks. Id. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled that Urbanski's identification of Hooks was not 
impermissibly suggestive, thus negating application of the Manson reliability factors. The 
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Minnesota Court of Appeals reasoned that a single photo lineup administered to a lay witness is 
unduly suggestive: 
It is commonly understood that the police solve crimes, so a witness naturally assumes 
that the police have unique expertise and information to determine the offender's identity. 
This confidence in police skill and insight demonstrates itself routinely; when the public 
learns that police have identified a suspect in some publicized crime, for example, the 
public, relying only on the perception of police credibility rather than on specific 
evidence, is generally influenced by the announcement and may tend to prejudge the 
suspect to be guilty. 
Id. at 84. 
By contrast, the Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled that a single photo lineup, self-
administered by law enforcement, is not impermissibly suggestive: 
we hold that an investigating police officer who obtains and observes for himself a 
driver's license photograph to identify for himself the person he observed committing the 
investigated crime does not implicate that person's due process rights. Unlike the 
eyewitness to whom a single police-supplied photograph might suggest the photographed 
person's guilt, Officer Urbanski could not have been unduly influenced by his own 
identification procedure. Acting as the investigating officer, Urbanski decided for himself 
which photograph to view to confirm his reasoning that the licensed driver of the car that 
officers stopped leaving the scene of the crime was the offending drug dealer. The lineup 
options therefore narrowed to a single photograph based on Urbanski's own reasoning, 
not based on the influence of an authority whose narrowing would tend to suggest a 
particular suspect to a witness. 
Id. at 85. 
By adopting Hooks' rationale, however, the Appellate Opinion wholly ignored the facts 
and rulings in Manson, a United States Supreme Court decision. In Manson, an undercover 
narcotics officer, Glover, purchased heroin from the defendant, whom he did not know, but was 
able to describe to another officer at the police station. 432 U.S. at 100. Recognizing the 
description of the heroin seller, the other officer showed Glover a single, non-lineup photograph 
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of the defendant and Glover identified the man in the photograph as the defendant who sold him 
heroin. Id. at 101. 
On a habeas petition, three separate federal courts confirmed that the single-photo lineup 
was unduly suggestive, even though the identifying witness was undisputedly law enforcement, 
specifically a trained narcotics officer. "The [ district] court noted that in the Second Circuit, its 
controlling court, it was clear that 'this type of identification procedure (display of a single 
photograph) is impermissibly suggestive and turned to the second inquiry"', the reliability of the 
identification. Manson, 432 U.S. at I 07-108. In direct contravention of Hooks, the district court 
did not deem the single-photo lineup permissible, or otherwise draw a distinction, where 
identification is made by law enforcement and not a lay witness. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling in Manson, 
ruling that "the exhibition of a single photograph to Glover was 'impermissibly suggestive,' and 
felt that, in addition, 'it was unnecessarily so."' Manson, 432 U.S. at 108. Again, Glover was a 
trained narcotics officer and his identification of the suspect in a single-photo lineup was deemed 
impermissibly suggestive, with no distinction drawn between identifications by lay and law 
enforcement witnesses. 
At the Supreme Court, the petitioner admitted that "the procedure in the instant case was 
suggestive (because only one photograph was used) and unnecessary (because there was no 
emergency or exigent circumstances)." Manson, 432 U.S. at 109. The Supreme Court noted that 
"[n]o explanation was offered by the prosecutor for the failure to utilize a photographic array or 
to conduct a lineup." Id. at 102. 
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The Court then enumerated the five specific factors, discussed supra, upon which a court 
may rely in determining whether an impermissibly-suggestive out of court identification is 
nonetheless sufficiently reliable as to be admissible: 
These include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, 
the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the 
level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and 
the confrontation. 
Id. at 114. See also United States v. Morgan, 690 F. Supp. 2d 274, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(undercover narcotics officer purchased crack cocaine from a defendant and identified him 
through the use of a six-photo array containing the defendant's photograph, as well as five 
"filler" photographs of "persons that look similar to the target photograph, based on the 
geographic area selected.") 
New Jersey state courts reached the same conclusion as Manson, flatly rejecting the 
reasoning set forth in Hooks: 
I agree with the majority's implicit disregard of the trial judge's determination that a 
different standard applies when the eyewitness is a police officer. Although police 
officers are no doubt cognizant of the importance of accurate identifications, that is no 
reason to leap to the assumption that police officers always make reliable identifications. 
Certainly the experience and training of police officers is a factor to be weighed but only 
with regard to the factors contained in the second prong of the Manson/Madison test; that 
an eyewitness is also a police officer does not present a basis for ignoring the corrupting 
effect of an impermissible identification procedure. 
State v. Micelli, 2012 WL 443996, at *12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 14, 2012), rev'd in 
part, 215 N.J. 284, 72 A.3d 235 (2013). See also State v. Roberts, 2010 WL 3516851, at *6 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 8, 2010) ("In the present case, the trial court found that the out-of-
court photographic showups of October 11 and 20 were impermissibly suggestive. The court did 
so upon a finding that Officer Kowalski, prior to viewing the October 11 photograph, was told 
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that the person in the photograph was Alice Roberts. By that point, Officer Kowalski had already 
been told that other officers had positively identified the seller in the October 6 operation as 
'Alice Roberts."") 
Thus, the relevant question appears to be one of first impression in Idaho, namely 
whether a different standard applies for law enforcement personnel, as opposed to lay witnesses, 
when determining whether an identification is impennissibly suggestive. Hooks stands for the 
proposition that a different, more deferential standard applies to law enforcement identifications, 
but Ms. Vargas can locate no instances of Hooks being applied outside Minnesota. By contrast, 
Manson explicitly recognized that an identification made by a trained narcotics officer was 
impennissibly suggestive because it resulted from a single-photo lineup. The Appellate Opinion 
ignored, and made no attempt to distinguish, the Manson identification by law enforcement 
personnel as part of a single-photo lineup which was deemed impennissibly suggestive. 
This Court should decline to create Idaho law adhering to Hooks and directly 
contravening Manson, an abundantly cited United States Supreme Court decision. To adopt 
Hooks' rationale is to rule that law enforcement are infallible in making identifications, that no 
matter how suggestive a single-photo lineup is, as long as law enforcement is making the 
identification, a resultant identification, by definition, cannot be impennissibly suggestive. The 
training of a law enforcement officer is appropriately considered as part of the Manson reliability 
factors, but those factors are never reached unless the identification is first deemed 
impennissibly suggestive. In practice, Hooks serves to inoculate all identifications made by Jaw 
enforcement from ever reaching the second step of scrutiny under the Manson reliability factors, 
as demonstrated by the Appellate Opinion's failure to do so. Such a firm and fast rule does not 
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allow for instances in which law enforcement errs and makes an identification on the basis of an 
impermissibly suggestive single-photo lineup. 
If Hooks is rejected, it does not mean that all impermissibly suggestive identifications, 
whether made by lay or law enforcement witnesses, will be suppressed. Such impermissibly 
suggestive identifications may nonetheless be admissible if the identification is deemed 
sufficiently reliable under the Manson reliability factors. The identification in Manson, though 
deemed impermissibly suggestive, was nonetheless ruled admissible based on its reliability. 
Manson, 432 U. S. at 114-16. Rejection of Hooks simply means that the Manson reliability 
factors will be reached in the case of all impermissibly suggestive out of court identifications, 
whether made by lay or law enforcement witnesses. 
Though, as discussed, the Appellate Opinion failed to reach the Manson reliability 
factors, the trial court considered them and erroneously concluded that Officer Wing's out of 
court identification was sufficiently reliable. The trial court relied most heavily on the second 
Manson factor, degree of witness attention: 
The degree of witness attention I think would probably be intense .... this is a police 
officer who's actively trying to figure out who it is who's driving, and so, I think their 
attention is laser focused on who that was driving. 
(Limine Tr., p. 18, L. 12-18.) 
The trial court, erred, however, because the Manson factors, particularly the first one, 
weighed heavily and decisively against the reliability, and therefore admissibility, of Officer 
Wing's out of court identification of Ms. Vargas. First, Officer Wing had minimal time to view 
the criminal at the time of the crime. Officer Wing observed the reflection of the criminal by 
virtue of a few glances in a side view mirror a few square inches in size, while driving 
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presumably at least a car length behind, in the pitch darkness at 10:48 p.m. Despite the trial court 
concluding that Officer Wing was "laser focused" on identifying the vehicle's driver, Officer 
Wing was able to describe the driver in no more detail than "Hispanic female" in her thirties. 
The State cited no authority, and counsel could locate none, in which an identification 
satisfying the Manson standard occurred absent face to face identification of the defendant by the 
witness. In both Morgan and Manson, supra, the predicate identification was face to face and 
stationary, as opposed to occurring in moving vehicles through mirrors at night in this case. In 
Manson, the undercover officer stood face to face within two feet of the defendant in an 
apartment doorway for two to three minutes, and the undercover officer's description included 
such detail as "his height, his build, the color and style of his hair, and the high cheekbone facial 
feature. It also included clothing .... " 432 U. S. at 114. In Morgan, the undercover officer also 
described the suspect in detail: "male black, medium build, approximately 23-27 years old, 5'7"-
5'309", 175-185 pounds, wearing black frame glasses, a black and white striped shirt, and blue 
jeans." 690 F. Supp. 2d at 284. Officer Wing's description of the driver of the vehicle as nothing 
more than a thirties Hispanic female is, by comparison to the descriptions in Manson and 
Morgan, so scant as to be non-existent and strongly indicative of the fact that Officer Wing could 
not have been paying close attention to the identity of the driver of the vehicle. 
Second, Officer Wing was focused on safely operating her vehicle and effecting a traffic 
stop. Notwithstanding her training and desire to identify the driver of the vehicle, Officer Wing 
could not have been solely and entirely focused on identifying the driver of the vehicle. 
Third, as discussed supra, Officer Wing's description of the driver of the vehicle, prior to 
identifying Ms. Vargas, was scant. Officer Wing identified the criminal as a "Hispanic female." 
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Officer Wing identified no further characteristics such as approximate age, build, tattoos, hair or 
eye color, or distinguishing physical characteristics. Approximately 99,296 persons in the state 
ofldaho fit the description of "Hispanic female". 1 
Fourth, Officer Wing undoubtedly demonstrated certainty in her identification of Ms. 
Vargas, but that is easy to do when the lineup consists of a single photograph of a person who 
matches the incredibly vague description of"Hispanic female". It would have been a simple task 
for Officer Wing, after obtaining Ms. Vargas's name, to ask a colleague to pull Ms. Vargas's 
photograph and then arrange a lineup of Hispanic females in order to make a non-suggestive 
identification. Officer Wing declined to do so, rendering her certainty in identifying Ms. Vargas 
in a lineup of one both expected and irrelevant. 
Fifth, it is unclear from Officer Wing's report how much time elapsed between her 
witnessing of the driver of the vehicle and her identification of Ms. Vargas in a highly suggestive 
lineup of one. 
Consideration of the Manson factors, as applied to this case, require exclusion of Officer 
Wing's highly unreliable nighttime, side view mirror, single photograph lineup identification of 
Ms. Vargas. 
2. In-Court Identification. 
In State v. Crawford, 99 Idaho 87, 577 P.2d I 135 (1978), the Idaho Supreme Court 
recognized that the "the due process test for suppression of an in-court identification that is 
allegedly tainted by an impermissibly suggestive out-of-court identification is whether the out-
1 Idaho Quickfacts - United States Census Bureau -Available: 
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/tab1e/PST0452 I 5/16 
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of-court identification was so suggestive that there is a very substantial likelihood of 
misidentification." Id. at 103, 577 P.2d at 1151 (citing Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 
(1977) and Neil v. Biggers, 490 U.S. 188 (1972)); see also State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 
657 P. 2d 17 (1983). 
Regarding Officer Wing's in-court identification of Ms. Vargas, the Appellate Opinion 
cursorily ruled that "[r]eliability concerns exist but they are not the product of improper police 
conduct." (R., 0161.) This ruling is the logical result of the Appellate Opinion's first ruling, that 
Officer Wing's out of court identification of Ms. Vargas was not impermissibly suggestive. 
Absent an impermissibly suggestive out of court identification, a related in-court identification 
does not give rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification. 
As discussed in the previous section, however, the Appellate Opinion erred in its ruling 
that Officer Wing's out of court identification of Ms. Vargas was not impermissibly suggestive. 
Officer Wing's out of court identification of Ms. Vargas was, in fact, both impermissibly 
suggestive and unreliable. 
Accordingly, there existed a substantial likelihood for Ms. Vargas to be misidentified in 
court by Officer Wing as a result of the tainted out of court identification. As discussed supra, 
Officer Wing identified Ms. Vargas in an inherently suspect single photo lineup. The 
identification was based on fleeting glances in a side view mirror, in pitch darkness, from a 
following car. The out of court identification was so suggestive as to be useless, and it 
irreconcilably taints any in-court identification of Ms. Vargas by Officer Wing. At trial it would 
be unreasonable to expect Officer Wing to completely block from memory her prior 
identification of Ms. Vargas in the single photo lineup and identify her anew, based solely on the 
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events of May 8, 2015. The Appellate Opinion erred in affirming the district court's denial of 
Ms. Vargas's motion in limine with regards to Officer Wing's in-court identification of Ms. 
Vargas. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, the Appellate Opinion is appropriately reversed. 
Dated this 23rd day of May, 2017. 
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